Martin Ravallion ("Why Don't We See Poverty Convergence?" American Economic Review, 102(1): 504-23; 2012) presents evidence against the existence of convergence in global poverty rates despite convergence in household mean income levels and the close linkage between income growth and poverty reduction. We show that this finding is driven by a specification that demands more than simple convergence in poverty headcount rates, and is additionally driven by poorly measured low poverty incidences. If we motivate the poverty convergence equation using an arguably superior semi-elasticity specification, we find highly significant and robust evidence of convergence in absolute poverty headcount ratios and poverty gaps in the developing world.
(1) where is the (absolute) poverty rate of country i at time t and * is a disturbance term.
This somewhat puzzling finding is explained in Ravallion (2012) by the adverse direct effect of poverty on economic growth and by the fact that a high initial poverty rate makes it harder to reduce poverty through growth in mean household income. Countries with low poverty rates have thus seen faster mean income growth and a higher elasticity of poverty reduction to mean income growth, given by in the specification 1 He empirically finds evidence for unconditional as well as conditional household income convergence, i.e. without and with control variables, with conditional convergence being quantitatively more rapid. 2 The poverty and income dataset is obtained from survey data available at povcal.net. It has a median interval between surveys of 13 years. About three quarters of household surveys use consumption instead of income data, as is common in the literature. See Ravallion (2012) for more details.
∆ ln = + ∆ ln + ,
where denotes mean consumption (income) and is the corresponding disturbance term. The parameter in equation (2) is usually referred to as the "growth elasticity of poverty reduction". It is well-known from the seminal work of Bourguignon (2003) that this elasticity "is a decreasing function of the development level of a country," i.e. it necessarily increases (in absolute terms) at lower initial levels of poverty under the assumption of log-normally distributed incomes and if income growth is distribution-neutral. 3 This increase per se has nothing to do with economic effects of poverty on income growth and convergence, which might certainly be at work, but is a mere identity reflecting the shape of the log-normal distribution and the associated fact that low initial poverty levels ceteris paribus lead to a high percentage reduction of poverty rates for a given growth rate.
An additional problem associated with the use of the poverty elasticity of growth is its high sensitivity to low poverty incidence, when percentage changes are particularly large and influential. This can bias econometric results as measurement error is usually an important problem when low poverty incidence observations are present in the data. 4 Additionally, policymakers are usually interested in percentage point, not percentage changes of the poverty rate. As a result, Klasen and Misselhorn (2008) suggest to use a growth semi-elasticity of poverty reduction instead, based on the specification
3 For empirical evidence that the income share of lower-income deciles does not systematically vary among countries with different growth rates, see Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. (2016) . 4 Even rounding issues introduce substantial measurement error at low levels of poverty incidence. For example, if poverty incidence fell from 4.4 to 1.6%, this is a decline of 64%. If rounded to 4 and 2% it is a decline of 50%. Similar rounding errors are much smaller at higher levels of poverty incidence. When using percentage point changes, such rounding errors introduce the same bias at all levels of poverty.
The difference in results between specifications linking growth and poverty reduction is depicted in Figures 1 and 2 , with an R squared of 37.7% and 51.5% for the elasticity and semi-elasticity, respectively. If we assume poverty dynamics given by equation (3) within the conceptual framework of Ravallion (2012) , we obtain the poverty convergence equation
instead of Ravallion's (2012) log-specification in equation (1). Also note that β* < 0 in equation (4) is sufficient for poverty to converge, as countries with higher initial poverty rates would see faster percentage point reductions of poverty rates.
Ravallion's equation (1) demands a much stronger concept of convergence, as it requires that a country should be more likely to reduce poverty from 60 to 30% than from, say, 4 to 2%, as both would imply a 50 percent reduction of the poverty rate. measures of poverty such as the poverty gap and even for the headcount ratio at the lower $1.25/day line, where the problem of initially low and imprecisely measured poverty rates is more severe. 5 Notes: The 'initial poverty' measure in columns (2)-(4) is the respective initial level corresponding to the dependent variable (i.e. the initial headcount at $2/day, at $1.25/day, and the initial poverty gap at $2/day, respectively). OLS results, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Figure 1 further highlights that practically all of the most severe outliers for the growth elasticity of poverty reduction regression are Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition economies. 6 For these countries Ravallion (2012: 509) states that their experience "is clearly not typical of the developing world." As shown in 5 Table A .1 in the appendix shows that these results are also robust to the inclusion of the control variables proposed by Ravallion (2012) . 6 The 11 Central and Eastern European countries in the sample, with their corresponding time spans, are Poland (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , Ukraine (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , Belarus (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , Latvia (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , Romania (1998 Romania ( -2005 , Russia (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , Albania (1996/97-2005) , Estonia (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , Lithuania (1996 Lithuania ( -2004 , Moldavia (1997 -2004 ), and Macedonia (1998 .
columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 and in Figure 3 (dashed line), dropping these observations or accounting for their special dynamics with a dummy variable is sufficient to obtain statistically significant poverty convergence even in the demanding log-specification (1) used by Ravallion (2012) . 7 This result is robust to alternative measures of poverty (poverty gap at $2/day and the headcount ratio at $1.25/day) and to the inclusion of control variables proposed by Ravallion (2012) . 8
A detailed analysis of this finding poses more challenging data requirements and is beyond the scope of this note, whose focus is to show that poverty convergence only requires the specification of a growth semi-elasticity of poverty reduction and that under this specification poverty convergence is indeed present in the developing world. Our results, however, highlight several aspects that need to be taken into account when addressing global poverty dynamics. First, CEE transition economies had historically low poverty rates, so even small percentage point changes will be reflected in relatively high percent changes in the log specification and get a very high leverage in the corresponding least-squares regression. Figure   3 reflects this, as low poverty is the exception among developing countries, so the CEE observations are far off the sample mean. This might also explain the many outliers in Figure 1 and might point to measurement error in the case of economies with low poverty incidence. 9 Second, the fact that we do not have to control for the particular dynamics of poverty in CEE countries in our alternative specification in order to obtain evidence of convergence reflects the fact that the semi-elasticity 7 In particular, it is sufficient to take out the observations of Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Latvia, which are the most outlying points, to obtain poverty convergence at the 5 percent level of statistical significance. Excluding Romania and Russia in addition leads to poverty convergence at the 1 percent significance level (results not reported but available on request). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that there are no significantly different convergence dynamics within the CEE group, as indicated by a statistically insignificant CEE-specific convergence parameter (results not reported but available on request). 8 See Table A .2 in the Appendix. 9 The mean initial poverty headcount in the CEE subsample is 5.6%, compared to 30.6% in the overall sample of Ravallion (2012) . approach proposed by Klasen and Misselhorn (2008) is less susceptible to (sometimes arbitrary or poorly measured) developments at the very left tail of the income distribution. Third, however, there seem to be CEE-specific dynamics that cannot be fully explained by the analytical implications of the growth elasticity of poverty reduction as derived by Bourguignon (2003) . Accordingly, the CEE dummy variable stays statistically significant in our specification of (absolute) poverty convergence (column (3) of Table 2 ), 10 without changing the overall results much (see Figure 4) . Fourth, the two most promising channels to explain the specific CEE dynamics appear to be cyclical reversion effects for the mean income growth rate 11 and unique distributional effects that influence the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. 12 10 It seems also worth noticing in this context that dropping the 5 or 10 percent of Ravallion's (2012) sample that had the lowest initial poverty incidence, as is usual in many empirical assessments of the growth elasticity, does not lead to observing poverty convergence in the sense of equation (1). 11 Prior to the sample period, CEE transition economies suffered severe shocks to their output level. Most neoclassical convergence models suggest that such countries, which are far off their steady state, should see higher subsequent growth ('cyclical reversion'). Indeed, CEE countries saw significantly higher mean income growth rates than implied by a simple mean income convergence regression (results are available upon request). 12 Inequality levels increased substantially during the initial output collapse in transition economies, with a positive relationship between the size of the output collapse and the increase in inequality (see Ivashenko, 2003; Grün and Klasen, 2001) . In subsequent years (which are those included in the sample) there was some decline of inequality in countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, moderating the massive inequality shock experienced earlier. As a result, the unconditional poverty elasticity of growth was larger in those countries, due to this decline in inequality, confirmed in Figure 1 . Do our findings imply that the argument in Ravallion (2012) about the adverse effect of high initial poverty on growth and on poverty reduction through growth in mean income are mistaken? On the one hand, despite finding robust poverty convergence, we still confirm the finding in Ravallion (2012) that countries with higher initial poverty see lower mean income growth rates 13 and experience a lower growth elasticity of poverty reduction after controlling for CEE-specific poverty dynamics (see columns (1)-(3) of appendix Table A .3). On the other hand, this is purely driven by the log specification of the dependent variable, as the growth semielasticity of poverty reduction is no longer dependent on the interaction with the initial poverty level, which is far from being statistically significant in either levels or logs. 14 This suggests that there is not necessarily a relevant economic effect of initial poverty slowing down subsequent poverty reduction but that it is by definition more difficult to obtain higher percent reductions in poverty rates at higher initial poverty levels, as shown by Bourguignon (2003) .
However, either specification suggests that poverty reduction strategies that are based exclusively on growth will only see very limited and slow effects on poverty reduction in countries where poverty is the most pressing problem. In the log specification, the significant interaction term implies that the positive effect between growth and poverty reduction practically vanishes for the majority of developing countries which face high initial poverty rates (see Figure 5 in the Appendix). In the semi-elasticity specification, this results from the implied economic magnitudes: based on Table 1 , column (2), assuming a country with a poverty headcount index (at $2 a day) of 41.1 percent (which is the mean at the final period of the sample) would imply an annual poverty reduction of 0.29 percentage 13 The negative effect of initial log poverty decreases from -0.02 (significant at the 1% level, Ravallion, 2012: Column (2) uses the same specification with the CEE dummy. Column (3) estimates the same model in a full logspecification, with the results used to obtain the parameters in Figure 6 . Columns (4)-(6) show these estimates for absolute poverty levels and changes. As the CEE dummy in column (4) is only significant when the (insignificant) interaction term is included, we drop both in specification (6). OLS results, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Figure 5 : Growth elasticity of poverty reduction by initial poverty level Note: Figure 6 displays the implied effect through the interaction between log initial poverty and mean income growth on log changes in poverty as estimated in Appendix Table A .3, specification (3) 
